The balance of party identification among registered voters has remained fairly stable over the past quarter century. All the same, at that place have been modest fluctuations: The new analysis, based on combined telephone surveys from 2018 and 2019, finds that the Autonomous Party's advantage in party identification has narrowed since 2017.

Share of registered voters who identify with the GOP has ticked up since 2017Overall, 34% of registered voters identify as independent, compared with 33% who identify as Democrats and 29% who identify as Republicans. The share of registered voters who place with the Republican Political party is up 3 percentage points, from 26% in 2017, while there has been no alter in the share who identify equally Democrats. The share of voters who identify as independents is iii points lower than it was in 2017.

When independents – and those who don't align with either major party – are included, 49% of all registered voters say they either place with or lean toward the Democratic Political party; slightly fewer (44%) say they identify with or lean toward the GOP. In 2017, the Democratic Party enjoyed a wider viii-point advantage in leaned political party identification (50% to 42%).

(Across many political attitudes, there is little difference between voters who lean toward a party and those who identify with that political party; this report primarily focuses on the combined measure of leaned party identification.)

Democrats have held the border in political party identification amongst registered voters since 2004. The electric current residual of leaned party identification is like to where it stood in 2016 – when 48% of voters identified as Democrats or leaned Democratic and 44% identified with or leaned toward the GOP – and in 2012 (also 48% Autonomous, 44% Republican). Come across detailed tables.

Gender gap in political party amalgamation widens

Persistent gender gap in partisanship; men are more likely than women to identify as independentsWomen continue to exist more likely than men to associate with the Democratic Party. The current gap in leaned party affiliation continues to be among the widest in yearly Pew Research Center surveys dating to 1994.

Amongst registered voters, 56% of women place with or lean toward the Autonomous Party compared with 42% of men. While the gender gap in partisanship is long-standing, it has gradually expanded since 2014 and now stands at 14 points. Between 1994 and 2014 the average gender gap in leaned party affiliation was 9 points.

Underlying the gender gap in leaned party identification is a gender deviation in voters' straight party identification: Men are more probable to identify as Republicans (31%) than Democrats (26%), while the reverse is truthful among women (39% identify as Democrats, 28% as Republicans).

Notably, men (39%) remain more probable than women (30%) to call themselves independents. Amidst men, a larger share of independent voters – and voters who don't align with either major party – lean toward the GOP than the Democratic Party, while the rest of partisan leaning amidst women who place as independents runs in the opposite direction.

Wide divides in partisanship persist by race and ethnicity

Some of the largest differences in partisanship continue to exist seen beyond racial and ethnic groups.

GOP holds edge in leaned party affiliation among whites, fares worse among other groupsThe GOP continues to maintain an reward in leaned political party identification amongst white voters (53% to 42%). Past contrast, sizable majorities of black, Hispanic and Asian American voters place with or lean toward the Democratic Political party. Among blackness voters, 83% place or lean toward the Democratic Party, compared with just x% who say they are Republican or lean toward the GOP.

The Democratic Party also holds a clear advantage over the GOP in leaned party identification among Hispanic voters (63% to 29%), though the margin is non every bit large as among black voters.

Among English-speaking Asian American voters, 72% identify or lean toward the Democratic Political party, compared with just 17% who identify with or lean toward the GOP. (Note: Just English-speaking Asian American voters are included in the data because Pew Research Center does not conduct its standard domestic political surveys in Asian languages.)

The balance of partisanship among white, blackness and Hispanic voters has been by and large stable over the by decade. However, English-speaking Asian American voters take shifted toward the Democratic Party.

In addition to the distinct partisan preferences expressed by unlike racial and ethnic groups, demographic changes in the country drive shifts in the composition of all registered voters. Since 1994, the share of white voters in the state declined from 85% to 68% today. By contrast, the share of Hispanic voters in the electorate has increased from just 4% in 1994 to 11% today. The share of blackness voters in the electorate has been largely stable over the past 25 years, though it'south slightly college now than in 1994 (xi% today vs. ix% so).

Democrats hold sizable reward amid college-educated voters

Over the past 25 years, in that location'due south been a central shift in the relationship between level of educational attainment and partisanship. The Democratic Political party has fabricated pregnant gains among voters with a college caste or more educational activity – a group that leaned toward the GOP 25 years ago. At the same time, the GOP now runs almost even with the Democratic Party among voters without a college degree afterward trailing among this grouping at the end of the George Due west. Bush administration. And the GOP has made clear gains in recent years amongst voters with the lowest level of formal pedagogy, those with no more a loftier school diploma.

Long-term gains for the Democratic Party among voters with at least a four-year college degreeA bulk of registered voters with at least a iv-year college degree (57%) identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party, while 37% associate with the GOP. The Democratic Political party's advantage with more highly educated voters has grown over the by decade and is wider than it was in both 2016 and 2012. In 1994, a greater share of those with at least a higher caste identified with or leaned toward the GOP than the Democratic Party (50% vs. 42%).

Among voters who do not accept a four-year college degree, 47% say they identify with or lean toward the GOP compared with 45% who identify with or lean toward the Autonomous Party. The GOP has gradually fabricated gains amid not-college voters since an ebb for the standing of their party in 2007 and 2008.

There are distinctions in party identification among voters who take at to the lowest degree a four-year caste and those who accept non completed college.

By a wide margin, voters with postgraduate experience identify as Democrats or lean DemocraticVoters with some postgraduate feel, in addition to a four-year college degree, are especially likely to acquaintance with the Democratic Party. Virtually six-in-x voters with postgraduate experience (61%) place with or lean toward the Autonomous Party, while just 33% associate with the Republican Party.

The Autonomous Party's advantage over the GOP is somewhat less pronounced amidst voters with a 4-year higher degree and no postgraduate feel (53% to xl%). However, both higher graduates and postgraduates accept seen comparable shifts toward the Autonomous Party over the past 25 years.

Republicans hold a slight 48% to 44% edge in leaned party identification among voters with no more than a high school diploma. Amid voters with some college experience but no four-twelvemonth caste, the Republican Party runs nigh even with the Democratic Party. Both groups have moved toward the GOP over the by decade, though the shift has been slightly more pronounced amid those with no more than a high school diploma than those with some higher experience.

These shifts in partisan preferences have taken place equally the educational makeup of all registered voters has undergone modify. The share of all voters with a college degree has grown from 24% in 1994 to 35% today. The share with a loftier school degree or less education has fallen sharply over the past 25 years, from 48% to 33% of all registered voters. And there's been a modest increase in the share of all voters with some college experience but no four-year degree (from 27% t0 33%).

White non-college voters have moved decisively toward the GOPRepublican gains among those without a college degree are especially visible among white voters. As recently every bit 2007, white voters without a college caste were nearly evenly divided in their leaned party affiliation. Since then, the GOP has made clear gains among this grouping and now holds a 59% to 35% reward over the Democratic Party.

By dissimilarity, white voters with a college degree have moved decisively toward the Democratic Political party, with significant changes occurring in just the terminal several years. In 2015, higher-graduate white voters were equally likely to identify with or lean toward the GOP every bit the Democratic Party. The Democratic Party opened upwardly a 4-signal edge amidst this group in 2016, and that advantage has grown to 12 points in the current data (54% to 42%). This marks a reversal from 1994, when the GOP held a 54% to 38% reward in leaned party identification among white voters with a college caste.

Every bit a consequence of these contrasting trends, there is at present a 19-point gap in the shares who place with or lean toward the Democratic Party between white voters with a higher degree and those without one (54% vs. 35%). In 1994, white voters without a higher caste were ii points more likely than those with a degree to acquaintance with the Democratic Party (40% vs. 38%).

GOP has two-to-one advantage in leaned party ID among white voters with no college experienceMuch of the movement toward the Republican Party amid white voters without a higher caste has been driven by those with the lowest levels of education – voters with no more than a high school diploma. The GOP now enjoys a two-to-one reward over the Democratic Party among white voters with no more than a high school diploma (62% to 31%). That represents a dramatic alter from the stop of the George W. Bush administration, when this group was virtually evenly divided in leaned party identification.

There has been less alter among white voters with some college experience just no four-year degree. This group continues to tilt Republican, and the current balance of leaned party identification (56% to 38%) is similar to other points in the contempo by.

Among white voters with a higher degree, those with some postgraduate experience stand up out for their potent Democratic orientation. Overall, 60% of white voters with postgraduate experience identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party, compared with 36% who identify with or lean toward the GOP. Among white voters with a college caste simply no postgraduate experience, 49% identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party, while 46% identify with or lean toward the Republican Party.

Both groups have experienced like shifts toward the Democratic Party over the past 25 years. In 1994, white voters with at least some postgraduate experience were well-nigh evenly divided betwixt the GOP and the Democratic Party, while those with a four-year degree were significantly more Republican than Autonomous (59% to 34%). Put another manner, in 1994 white voters with postgraduate experience were 12 points more likely than whites with a college caste to associate with the Democratic Party; today that gap remains about the same (11 points).

In the past 10 years, both men and women without a college degree take edged toward the GOP in their leaned political party affiliation. However, gender gaps amidst non-higher voters persist: The Republican Party holds an advantage in leaned partisanship among men without a college caste (52% t0 40%), while the Democratic Party holds an edge amongst women without a college caste (51% to 42%).

While the partisan preferences of both men and women without a college degree have moved toward the GOP over the past decade, this marks a return to about the same levels of partisanship seen in 1994, every bit the Republican Political party has regained ground it had lost between the late 1990s and cease of the George Due west. Bush-league assistants.

By dissimilarity, men and women with a college degree are significantly more Democratic in their orientation than 25 years agone. Even so, a broad gap in leaned party amalgamation remains between college-educated men and women.

Among men with a college caste, 48% place with or lean toward the Democratic Party, while 46% of these voters place with or lean toward the GOP. Among women with a higher degree, the Democratic Party holds a wide 35-point advantage in leaned party affiliation (65% t0 xxx%).

Both groups are far more Autonomous in their partisan preferences than in 1994, though the motility toward the Autonomous Party has been slightly greater among women than men. Women voters with a higher degree are 17 points more likely to place with or lean toward the Democratic Party than they were 25 years ago, while there has been a ten-bespeak increase among men with a higher degree.

Sharp divergence among white women in leaned partisanship by level of educationThe broader trends in leaned party amalgamation by gender and instruction tin can be seen among white voters. In particular, white women with a college degree accept moved sharply abroad from the GOP. While white men with a college caste take too moved away from the GOP, the sharper movement among higher-graduate white women has expanded the partisan gap betwixt the two groups.

In 1994, white men with a college degree were somewhat more likely than those without a higher education to identify with or lean toward the GOP (59% to 55%). Over the by 25 years, white male voters with a 4-year degree have moved away from the GOP, while those without a caste accept moved toward the party. Equally a result, white men without a college degree are now 11 points more probable than those with a caste to acquaintance with the GOP (62% to 51%).

This pattern is even more pronounced among white women. In 1994, white women voters with a higher caste were ii points more than likely than those without ane to identify with or lean toward the GOP (48% to 46%). Today, a bulk of white women without a college degree (55%) identify with or lean to the GOP, compared with but 34% of white women with a four-twelvemonth higher didactics.

The current 21-indicate gap in GOP affiliation between white women with and without a college degree is larger than the 11-point educational activity gap among white men.

In addition, the partisan gap betwixt white men and women with a college caste is wide and has grown over time. Among voters with a college degree, white men are 17 points more likely than white women to identify with or lean toward the GOP. This gap was smaller (11 points) in 1994. The current gender gap among white college graduates is much wider than the 7-point divergence in GOP amalgamation between white men and women without a college degree.

Amid nonwhite voters, while there is a gender gap, there is very petty difference in the partisanship of either men or women past level of education. Between 1994 and 2010, nonwhite men with a higher degree were slightly more Republican in their partisan leanings than those without a caste, merely this gap has closed in contempo years.

Generational divides in partisanship

Millennials more Democratic in their leaned party affiliation than older generationsGeneration continues to be a dividing line in American politics, with Millennials more likely than older generations to associate with the Democratic Party. Yet, over the by few years the Democratic Party has lost some basis among Millennials, even as information technology has improved its standing amongst the oldest accomplice of adults, the Silent Generation. Gen Xers and Infant Boomers take seen less change in their partisan preferences and remain closely divided between the 2 major parties. (Note: The youngest registered voters – those xviii to 23 in 2020 – are at present members of Generation Z ; however, due to the relatively small-scale share of this generation in machismo, this generational analysis does non include them.)

Overall, 54% of Millennial registered voters say they identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party, compared with 38% who identify with or lean toward the GOP. In 2017, the Democratic Party held a wider 59% t0 32% reward among this grouping. All the same, the Democratic Party's standing with Millennials is well-nigh the same every bit it was at earlier points, including 2014.

Voters in the Silent Generation are now about every bit likely to identify with or lean toward the GOP as the Autonomous Party (49% to 48%). This marks a change from 2017, when the GOP held a 52% to 43% advantage in leaned party identification among the oldest voters. Still, the partisan leanings of Silent voters have fluctuated over the past few decades, and there have been other moments where the two parties ran about fifty-fifty – or the Democratic Party held a narrow advantage – since 1994.

Gen Xers and Infant Boomers are closely divided in their partisan leanings. Among Gen Ten voters, the Democratic Party holds a narrow 48% to 45% advantage in leaned party amalgamation. Among Baby Boomer voters, 47% identify with or lean toward the GOP, while 46% identify with or lean toward the Autonomous Party. Both generations have been about evenly separate in their partisan leanings for virtually of the past decade.

When looking at straight party identification – and not taking the partisan leaning of independents into business relationship – younger voters continue to be more likely to identify equally independent than older voters. Among Millennials, 42% identify as independents, compared with 35% of Gen Xers, thirty% of Baby Boomers and 25% of Silents.

Gender gaps in party affiliation seen among older as well as younger generationsBeyond all generations, women remain more likely than men to associate with the Democratic Party.

For case, among Millennial voters, women are 12 points more than likely than men to identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party (sixty% to 48%). The gap between the shares of women and men who acquaintance with the Democratic Party is 18 points among Gen Xers, x points amongst Baby Boomers and 7 points among Silents.

However, there have been notable shifts in leaned party affiliation inside generations by gender in recent years.

Millennial women voters are 10 points less likely to identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party than they were in 2017. While the Democratic Political party however holds a wide 60% to 31% reward amidst this group, it's significantly smaller than information technology was in 2017 (70% to 23%), which was a loftier-water mark for the party amid this group.

Millennial men have edged toward the GOP in contempo years, only the shift in their leaned partisanship has been much smaller than among Millennial women.

Among Gen Ten voters, the partisan leanings of men and women have moved in opposite directions in the past few years. Gen X women are 3 points more probable to identify with or lean toward the Democratic Political party than they were in 2017, while Gen X men have go 4 points more likely to acquaintance with the GOP. As a result, the gender gap in leaned Democratic Political party affiliation between Gen X men and women has grown from 11 points in 2017 to eighteen points in combined 2018-2019 data. And Gen Ten women are now almost as likely equally Millennial women to associate with the Democratic Party (57% to 60%).

There has been little change in the partisan leanings of men and women Babe Boomers in recent years. Amid Silent Generation voters, the Democratic Party has improved its continuing somewhat with both men and women.

Across all generations, the Democratic Political party now holds an border among women in leaned party amalgamation (though the size of their advantage is larger amongst younger than older generations). Among men, the GOP has an advantage among Gen Xers, Baby Boomers and Silents, but trails the Autonomous Party in leaned party affiliation by 4 points amongst Millennial men.

White Millennials closely split in their partisanship, but still more Democratic than whites in older generationsEqually with voters overall, at that place are wide divides in leaned partisanship by race and ethnicity beyond generations.

White voters in all generations are significantly more than likely to place with or lean to the GOP than nonwhite voters. However, the size of the partisan gap by race and ethnicity is wider amid older generations than among younger ones.

Among white Millennial voters, the Democratic Party holds a narrow 48% to 45% reward in leaned party identification. A clear majority of nonwhite Millennials (64%) identify with or lean to the Democratic Party; just 26% identify with or lean to the GOP.

The Republican Political party holds an reward among white voters in older generations. Comparable majorities of white Gen X (54%), Babe Boomer (55%) and Silent (56%) voters place with or lean toward the GOP.

Among nonwhite voters, about 2-thirds or more identify with or lean to the Democratic Party. The size of the bulk associating with the Democratic Party tends to exist larger among older nonwhite generations than younger ones: 78% of Silents, 70% of Baby Boomers, 66% of Gen Xers and 64% of Millennials identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party.

As a consequence of these patterns, the gap in Democratic affiliation between white and nonwhite voters is xvi points among Millennial voters, but rises to 26 points among Gen Xers, 31 points among Infant Boomers and 37 points among Silents.

Religious divides in partisanship

Partisanship has go increasingly tied to religious identification over the past quarter century.

White evangelical Protestants accept seen one of the largest moves toward the GOP over the past 25 years. In 1994, 61% of white evangelical Protestant voters leaned toward or identified with the Republican Political party, while 31% leaned toward or identified with the Democratic Political party. Today, the GOP has opened up an overwhelming 78% to 17% advantage in leaned partisanship amidst white evangelicals, making them the most solidly Republican major religious grouping in the country.

White evangelicals and white Catholics continue to trend toward the Republican Party; religiously unaffiliated voters have moved toward the Democratic Party

The GOP holds somewhat narrower advantages in leaned party identification among white non-evangelical Protestants (54% to 39%) and white Catholics (57% to 38%). Both groups of voters have moved toward the Republican Party over time, though the shift has been more pronounced amid white Catholics.

Hispanic Catholics stand out from their white counterparts in their clan with the Autonomous Party. Roughly two-thirds of Hispanic Catholics (68%) identify with or lean toward the Democratic Party. The partisan leanings of Hispanic Catholics take not changed much in contempo years.

Among those who practice not chapter with an organized religion, 67% identify with or lean to the Democratic Party, compared with just 24% who identify or lean toward the GOP. Religiously unaffiliated voters have been trending steadily toward the Democratic Party over the past few decades and represent a growing share of all registered voters (Come across Chapter 2 for more on the changing profile of the electorate).

Voters who attend religious services more often are generally more than probable than those who attend less ofttimes to identify with or lean toward the Republican Political party. This gap is particularly pronounced amongst Jewish voters.

Voters who attend religious services regularly are typically more Republican than less-frequent attendersOverall, the Democratic Party holds a 68% to 27% advantage in leaned party identification over the GOP among all Jewish voters. However, nearly half (47%) of Jewish voters who attend religious services at least a few times a calendar month identify with or lean toward the Republican Political party, compared with a much smaller share (22%) of those who attend services less often.

This same pattern is seen among several other religious groups, including white evangelicals, though it is not as pronounced as amidst Jewish voters.

Eight-in-ten white evangelicals who nourish religious services at least a few times a month associate with the GOP, compared with 70% of those who attend services less ofttimes. A similar sized gap exists among white Catholics.

Among other religious groups, there is piddling relationship betwixt religious omnipresence and partisanship. Among both white non-evangelical Protestants and black Protestants, there are only small differences in partisanship between those who attend church monthly and those who attend less oftentimes.

Geographic divisions in partisanship

Voters living in urban counties and those living in rural counties have grown further autonomously in their partisan preferences over the last few decades.

Among voters living in urban counties, the Democratic Party holds a tw0-to-one advantage in leaned party identification (62% to 31%). By contrast, 58% of voters living in rural counties place with or lean toward the GOP; 35% place with or lean toward the Democratic Political party.

In 1999, the first year for which Pew Research Center surveys have county-level information, rural counties were almost evenly divided in their partisanship. Since then, GOP affiliation amidst voters in rural counties has increased 13 points, with much of this motion occurring over the past x years or and so. Voters in urban counties already tilted Autonomous in 1999 (53% to 35%); withal, the Democratic Party'south standing among these voters has increased 9 points over the past two decades.

Voters in suburban counties are about evenly divided in their leaned political party affiliation, as they have been for much of the past xx years.

Urban-rural partisan divide has increased in recent years; suburban counties remain closely divided

Urban-rural partisan divides seen across regionsAcross dissimilar regions of the country, voters living in urban counties are substantially more likely than those living in rural counties to place with or lean toward the Democratic Party.

For case, 72% of voters in the Northeast who live in urban counties associate with the Autonomous Party, compared with 49% of Northeastern voters who live in rural counties.

Southern voters in urban counties are less likely than their Northeastern counterparts to identify with or lean toward the Autonomous Party (55% vs. 72%). Still, urban voters in the S are much more than likely than rural Southern voters to align with the Democratic Party (55% vs. 33%).

While at that place is an urban-rural gap in leaned partisanship across regions, the trajectory of changes over time varies. For instance, the current gap in the South is far larger than it was 20 years agone and has been driven by a abrupt move abroad from the Democratic Party among rural voters. In the Northeast, the urban-rural gap is roughly the same size equally information technology has been for most of the past ii decades, and rural voters there accept become more likely to place with or lean toward the Autonomous Party over time.